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It is also to be noted that the court in DiBartolo punished the
plaintiff even though defendant had not made a motion to compel
disclosure under CPLR 3124.257
Another recent case in the third department has also applied
similar penalties where the defendant willfully refused to comply
with disclosure orders in connection with an examination before
triaIJ. s  However, it is to be noted that here the plaintiff had
moved to punish the defendants for contempt. In denying the
motion the court added that such motion may be renewed if more
drastic punishment is necessary to secure defendant's compliance
with the disclosure orders.159 Accordingly, the court ordered the
imposition of court costs and counsel fees, in addition to requiring
that the disclosure proceedings be continued. Although the court
indicated it would not adjudge the defendant to be in contempt,
it clearly stated that such remedy was available if future conduct
justified its use. 60
As a result of these cases, the courts now seem to be willing
to apply more stringent penalties for refusing to obey a court order
for disclosure. However, the question of whether the courts will
impose a contempt penalty for violation of CPLR 3126 remains
unanswered. Due to the heavy amount of litigation in this area,
it is to be expected that the question will soon be resolved.
ARTICLE 32- AccELERATE JUDGMENT
CPLR 3213: Defendant's failure to answer motion for summary
judgment does not allow a default judgment in
action prior to return date of motion.
As originally enacted, CPLR 3213 161 limited a defendant to
a twenty-day answering period subsequent to service of a summons
and notice of motion for summary judgment. Since such an in-
flexible time period was inconsistent with the variety of answering
151 CPLR 3103; Mostow v. Shorr, 44 Misc. 2d 733, 255 N.Y.S.2d 320
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964).
158 Warner v. Bumgarner, 49 Misc. 2d 488, 267 N.Y.S2d 825 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1966).
159 Id. at 493, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
160 Ibid. One commentator believes that the remedy of contempt is available
under this section, 3 WmxNsTEIx, Koan & MILFr, Nv YoRx CiviL PRActicE
1r3126.06 (1965), whereas another believes that CPLR 3126 is "a pre-
emptive statement of the remedies that may be sought for a party's failure
to disclose," 7B McK1.NNEY'S CPLR 3126, supp. commentary 76, 82
(1964), and that contempt is not available.
161 Originally CPLR 3213 provided: "When an action is based upon a
judgment or instrument for the payment of money only, the plaintiff may
serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary judgment and
the supporting papers in lieu of complaint, returnable at least twenty days
after service." (Emphasis added.)
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periods found in CPLR 320(a) ,162 the Judicial Conference pro-
posed an amendment,'6 3 enacted in 1965, to eliminate the conflict.
Under the amended version of CPLR 3213, defendant has an addi-
tional ten days in which to respond to plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment in lieu of complaint, if he is not served personally
within the state.
Legislative history does not show, however, that reference
to CPLR 320(a) time periods in CPLR 3213 would necessitate
application of corollary section 3215,164 allowing default judgments
for failure to appear. In establishing more equitable time periods,
the legislature seems not to have considered the situation in which,
as in Knudson v. Flynn-Hill, Knudson Elevator Corp.,62 the de-
fendant made no attempt to answer the motion papers, but merely
appeared in court on the return date of the motion. When the
defendant appeared in court to answer the motion, he learned that
it was no longer on the calendar, a default judgment having been
entered on the date he was to have served an answer to the plain-
tiff's motion.
Plaintiff argued that since CPLR 305(b) notice had been
served on the defendant, the latter's failure to answer the motion
constituted a failure to appear in response to the summons, em-
powering the clerk to enter a default judgment prior to the return
date of the motion.
The court rejected this argument, however, taking into con-
sideration the "newness of the amendment," 166 the operation of
the section as "a trap to the unwary," 167 and, most importantly,
the specific language of CPLR 3213 and 3215. Since CPLR 3213
speaks only of answering the motion and does not mention an
appearance by the defendant as does 3215, the court reasoned that
failure to answer the motion is a default on that motion only,
162 CPLR 320(a) states that defendant must appear within twenty days,
if summons was personally served upon him within the state. Absent per-
sonal service, he must appear within thirty days. In all other cases, he must
appear within thirty days of service.
163 1965 JUD. CONF. REP. 71-72.
164 CPLR 3215 states: "When a defendant has failed to appear, plead or
proceed to trial of an action reached and called for trial .. . the plaintiff
may seek a default judgment against him."16;49 Misc. 2d 78, 266 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966).
166 Knudson v. Flynn-Hill, Knudson Elevator Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 78, 80,
266 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966). CPLR 305(b)
creates a unique type of notice which states the sum of money for whichjudgment will be taken in case of default. This provision can be used when
a sum certain or a computably certain sum is in issue.
167 Knudson v. Flynn-Hill, Knudson Elevator Corp., supra note 166, at
81, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 900. See also Paul v. Weiss, 48 Misc. 2d 683, 265
N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct Sullivan County 1965) (court accepted reply
affidavits, although in default, in view of the newness of the rule and lack
of a CPA predecessor).
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and not a default in the action itself.1V8  Furthermore, since the
three methods of appearance specified in CPLR 320(a) do not
include the service of an answer to a motion,8 9 it was held that
defendant could not be considered in default until the return date
of the motion. Thus, this decision interprets the reference to CPLR
320(a) in CPLR 3213 as merely setting forth the time allowable
for the return of motion papers, rather than as giving an exact
date upon which a defendant will automatically be in default.
The opinion of the court in the principal case is consistent
with the purpose and spirit of the legislation. That purpose is
"to destroy the delay incident upon waiting for an answer, and
then moving for summary judgment."'170 The Judicial Conference
designed the amendment "to allow plaintiff time to study the, an-
swering papers. .... "171 This more simple, direct, time and ex-
pense saving procedure can not be considered so desirable as to
allow a defendant to be deprived of his day in court. Moreover,
there is no undue delay in the disposition of meritorious claims in-
herent in a rule which prevents a default judgment in the brief
span between the date set for service of answering papers and the
return date.
CPLR 3216: Court can dismiss for want of prosecution on basis
of "general delay."
The calm in the plaintiffs' bar created by the interpretation
that Salama v. Cohen 172 destroyed general delay as an independent
basis for a CPLR 3216 motion, was, viewed retrospectively, the quiet
before a storm. Ignoring those who considered Salama the last
word on the interpretation of the 1964 Volker Amendment, the
Court of Appeals, in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lafayette Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc.'7 3 restricted the applicability of the forty-five day
demand requirement solely to motions based on failure to file a
note of issue. Simultaneously, the Court recognized the existence
of unreasonable "general delay" as a separate basis for dismissal
for want of prosecution.
With this recognition of general delay, the controversy sur-
rounding the extensiveness of the 1964 amendment has come full
168 Id. at 80, 266 N.Y.S2d at 899.
169 Supra note 163, at 30. Any extension (up to 10 days) over the minimum
period provided by CPLR 320 (a), granted by the plaintiff, entitles him
to a copy of the answering papers that many days before the return date
of the motion.
170 Knudson v. Flynn-Hill, Knudson Elevator Corp., supra note 166, at
81, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
1717B McKixNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary 817 (1963).
172 16 N.Y2d 1058, 213 N.E2d 461, 266 N.Y.S2d 131 (1965); see 40
ST. JoHN's L. Rzv. 303, 340 (1966).
73 17 N.Y2d 367, 212 N.E2d 271, 272 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1966).
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